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Abstract
Contemporary democracies are increasingly shaped by a surge of populism, posing serious threats to the idea of liberal
democracy. Particularly in the run-up to elections, knowledge of such threats is essential for citizens to cast an informed
vote. Against this background, the present study examined the likelihood of media users to engage with political news
providing critical perspectives on populist movements in a 24-hour social media field experiment during the 2017 federal
election campaign in Germany (N = 210). Based on two selective exposure measures, findings suggest that exposure to
critical news is contingent upon the conceptualization of populist partisanship as a political orientation of either high com-
mitment (i.e., voting intention) or high affinity (i.e., sympathy for a party).While high commitment triggered a rather classic
confirmation bias, especially regarding click decisions, high affinity caused selection patterns to be more strongly guided
by informational utility, particularly during newsfeed browsing, with counter-attitudinal information receiving more at-
tention. When public sentiment cues were present, however, attitudinal patterns disappeared. These findings imply that
partisan news use in times of political upheaval is best gauged by taking a closer look at the particular type of partisanship
that guides selective exposure, as both types of partisanship caused contrary exposure patterns, and that today’s news
environments potentially override attitudinal influences by providing additional social monitoring cues.
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1. Introduction
In the run-up to elections, political news about the in-
cumbent government and the political opposition help
citizens cast an informed vote by providing clues on how
to evaluate the government’s past performance com-
pared to competing party agendas. The media’s pub-
lic service function is becoming ever more important
in recent years, with new right-wing populist move-
ments starting to systematically challenge the consti-
tutional foundation of liberal democracy and the per-
formance of established democratic parties in Western
democracies (Galston, 2018; Spruyt, Keppens, & Van
Droogenbroeck, 2016). Indeed, journalistic news cover-
age has been shown to monitor populist movements
mainly from a critical-analytical perspective, seldom leav-
ing populist statements by political actors unopposed
and often taking a critical stance on populist parties to
point out threats they potentially pose to democracy
(Müller et al., 2017; Negrine, 2017).
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However, in times of disputed journalistic credibil-
ity in the wake of political polarization (Hanitzsch, Van
Dalen, & Steindl, 2018) and a diminishing public demand
for journalistic news (Dahlgren, 2019), it remains an open
question whether critical-analytical journalism is able to
actually reach the public and, thus, contribute to en-
hanced public awareness of populist threats, especially
when news consumption is now more commonly taking
place in social, high-choice media environments.
Against this background, the present study investi-
gates selective exposure to critical-analytical news on
populism in a 24-hour social media field experiment dur-
ing the 2017 federal election campaign in Germany, char-
acterized by a surge of the right-wing populist party AfD.
Based on an experimental design of high ecological valid-
ity, selective exposure will be examined—both as visibil-
ity time of posts in participants’ newsfeeds and the num-
ber of posts participants clicked on—with regards to two
main drivers of news exposure in times of political and
technological upheaval, namely partisanship and public
sentiment cues.
The findings of our study suggest that selective ex-
posure research may benefit from differentiating more
clearly between high party commitment and high party
affinity as two separate constructs when examining the
effects of partisanship on selective news exposure in the
context of new political movements, as they appear to
affect news exposure in opposite ways. Furthermore, so-
cial cues provided by today’s news environments were
found to be decisive in attenuating selection biases, in-
creasing user openness across the political spectrum to-
wards critical news regarding populism.
2. Partisan Selective Exposure in Times of Political
Upheaval
Critical news coverage can essentially help citizens be-
come aware of populist threats by clarifying the demo-
cratic implications of populist demands. However, extant
research on confirmation bias in partisan selective expo-
sure suggests that the actual awareness of such threats
greatly depends onmedia users’ political predispositions,
as users tend to prefer information that aligns with
their political preferences while avoiding—although to
a smaller extent (Garrett, 2009)—information that chal-
lenges their viewpoints (Feldman, Wojcieszak, Stroud, &
Bimber, 2018; Knobloch-Westerwick, Mothes, Johnson,
Westerwick, & Donsbach, 2013).
The determining motivational drivers of confirma-
tion biases are often explained by drawing on cog-
nitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). According
to dissonance theory, individuals selectively approach
attitude-bolstering content and avoid challenging infor-
mation in order to reduce discomfort and maintain a
consistent self-image (see also Aronson, 1999; Knobloch-
Westerwick, 2015). In the area of political communica-
tion, a mounting number of studies supports this no-
tion, demonstrating the reinforcing effects of partisan
selective exposure on political self-views as indicated
by increased attitude strength or attitude accessibil-
ity (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2012; Matthes & Schmuck,
2017), which in turn can stimulate further reinforcement
of confirmation biases (Dahlgren, Shehata, & Strömbäck,
2019; Stroud, 2010).
In social psychology, most consistent support for
the notion of partisan selective exposure was found in
instances of ‘postdecisional’ dissonance regarding past
behaviours or beliefs held with strong commitment,
thereby becoming less amenable to change (D’Alessio
& Allen, 2002; Mills, 1999). Hence, in pre-election con-
texts, partisan selective exposure is most likely to occur
among voters who have already decided upon whom
to cast their vote for. Although voting intentions can
change over time, this scenario is unlikely for commit-
ted supporters of populist parties, as populism stresses
partisanship to a special degree by cultivating strong in-
group favouritism, fostering positive political self-views
through emphasizing an idealized homogeneity of the
people, while simultaneously excluding non-compliant
and non-eligible segments of the population as out-
groups (Bos et al., in press; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).
From a social identity perspective, the sense of be-
longing to an ingroup is not unique to populism, but
rather serves as a major reference point for media
users in general to perform confirmation biases in the
context of partisan news exposure (Stroud, Muddiman,
& Lee, 2014; Wojcieszak & Garrett, 2018). The case
of populism—more specifically right-wing populism—is
special, however, in that the definition of the ingroup
is far more exclusive and is accompanied by particularly
strong affective appeals (Wirz, 2018). In contrast to its
alleged representation of the people as a whole, right-
wing populism actually draws a clear line between those
who share its ideology and those who do not, reserving
the right to belong—and thus access to the ingroup—
solely for those who subscribe to the populist ideology
(Berbuir, Lewandowsky, & Siri, 2015). Accordingly, pop-
ulist voters were shown to be particularly interested in
political information that actively addresses the gaps be-
tween the ‘innocent’ ingroup and the ‘culprit’ outgroup
(Hameleers, Bos, & De Vreese, 2017). Not surprisingly,
this anti-pluralism creates a particularly strong sense of a
‘politicized self’ (Bos et al., in press), which in turn leads
to a generally greater perceived stigmatization by and ac-
tual skepticism of mainstream parties, their supporters,
and the media (e.g., Eberl, 2019; Van Spanje & Azrout,
2019). In light of the strong ingroup-outgroup polariza-
tion instigated by populist movements and against the
background of the vast empirical evidence in support
of general partisan confirmation biases, we, therefore,
pose the following hypothesis:
H1: Prospective voters of a right-wing populist party
will less be likely to expose themselves to critical
news about their party than prospective voters of
other parties.
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In the context of established democratic parties, parti-
sanship was found to highly correlate with other types
of political predispositions, such as issue positions, gen-
eral political ideology, or sympathy for a given party
(Jou & Dalton, 2017; Knobloch-Westerwick & Klein-
man, 2012; Knobloch-Westerwick &Meng, 2011; Stroud,
2010), each often yielding similar effects in terms of
confirmation biases. However, this general consistency
of political orientations—and their effects on selective
exposure—may not equally apply to populism, as atti-
tudes of populist sympathizers towards populism appear
to bemuchmore ambiguous and inconsistent than those
of committed populist voters. In Germany, for example,
only a minor part of the population would actually vote
for the AfD (16%) although a majority of citizens have
been dissatisfied with the overall government perfor-
mance (68%) and its handling of immigration issues (51%;
Infratest Dimap, 2018), considered as two main drivers
of voting in favour of right-wing populism (Reinemann,
Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & De Vreese, 2017; Walgrave,
Lefevere, & Tresch, 2019). Especially the politically dis-
enchanted segments of the electorate may thus sympa-
thize with populist agendas in the run-up to an election
but do not necessarily support populists in elections, not
even for the purpose of protest voting (Giebler & Regel,
2018). A major reason for this inconsistency likely lies in
the political programs of populist parties themselves, as
they are usually narrow in terms of their issue agendas,
less clearly explicated, and far more reluctant to politi-
cal compromise than the programs of established demo-
cratic parties (Fenger, 2018; Mudde, 2004; Reinemann
et al., 2017). Voting for populist parties thus contains
many unknown risks for sympathizers, as the outcomes
of a populist party’s election victory are less predictable.
In light of this uncertainty, citizens with an affinity for
populist parties should not only considerably differ from
sympathizers of mainstream parties in terms of their
eventual commitment to the party; they should also dif-
fer from committed populist voters in terms of how they
approach attitude-challenging information, such as crit-
ical news on populism. While classic confirmation bias
frameworks suggest that sympathizers of established
democratic parties show confirmation biases merely to
a smaller extent due to lower levels of partisanship (e.g.,
Stroud, 2010), we expect populist sympathizers to not
only show reduced levels of confirmation biases but to
exhibit even inverse exposure patterns, caused by the
high political uncertainty regarding populism’s handling
of a potential election victory. Hence, news exposure
of populist sympathizers should not be primarily driven
by aspirations to protect preexisting attitudes but more
likely by a need for orientation (Arendt & Fawzi, 2018),
that is, by the informational utility of messages that crit-
ically examine populist movements before an election.
According to informational utility frameworks (Atkin,
1973; Knobloch-Westerwick, 2008), high uncertainty in
how to adapt to the (political) environment leads me-
dia users to primarily engage with information that
provides assistance in future decision making, regard-
less of whether it confirms or challenges previous at-
titudes. Accordingly, a study by Knobloch-Westerwick
and Kleinman (2012) found that informational utility in-
deed overrides confirmation biases among voters who
perceive high uncertainty before an election (see also
Pearson & Knobloch-Westerwick, 2019). While these
studies, however, expected and found similar patterns
across all supporters of a specific established democratic
party—irrespective of their level of commitment to this
party—the present study expects informational utility
only to override confirmation biases amongpopulist sym-
pathizers due to their higher need for orientation in face
of the risky and uncertain political enterprise populist
parties stand for. In contrast to what was expected for
prospective voters, we, therefore, pose the following hy-
pothesis on partisanship with regards to less committed
yet highly sympathetic party supporters:
H2: Higher affinity for a right-wing populist party will
lead to increased exposure to critical news about
this party.
3. Partisan Selective Exposure in Times of
Technological Upheaval
The effects of partisanship have been studied in various
user contexts, with an increasing focus on online set-
tings, related to vivid academic debates about the extent
to which political preferences exert control over selec-
tive exposure in digital environments. While some schol-
ars point to an increasing influence of political predispo-
sitions in times of ‘echo chambers’ and ‘filter bubbles’
(Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Pearson & Knobloch-
Westerwick, 2019), a majority of empirical studies found
only limited support for a prevalence of partisan selec-
tive exposure online (Beam, Hutchens, & Hmielowski,
2018; Nelson & Webster, 2017). The latter findings are
commonly explained by a greater likelihood of inciden-
tal exposure to attitude-challenging information due to
increased content variety and weak ties to users with di-
verse opinions (Brundidge, 2010; Weeks, Lane, Kim, Lee,
& Kwak, 2017).
These potential constraints for partisan biases to oc-
cur online have been mainly discussed in reference to
social media as increasingly prevalent news sources. On
social media, users are thought to more likely to engage
with cross-cutting news, as content is accompanied by so-
cial endorsements that provide important cues formedia
users tomonitor their social environment—an observant
behaviour of ‘analytic labour’ that has become habitu-
ated among online users to reduce uncertainty (Kaiser,
Keller, & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018; Karakayali & Kilic,
2013). In contrast to user statistics (i.e., number of shares
and views) or personal recommendations by friends, pub-
lic sentiment cues such as ‘likes’ and additional emoti-
cons should particularly suit media users’ social monitor-
ing aspirations, as they allow users to get an idea of what
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the broader online public sphere thinks about political is-
sues (Porten-Cheé & Eilders, 2019), thereby offering im-
portant heuristics for users to decide upon what informa-
tion to access (Kaiser et al., 2018).
Although initial experimental studies indicate that
public sentiment cues may indeed moderate the effects
of political attitudes on selective news exposure (Dvir-
Gvirsman, 2019; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Winter,
Metzger, & Flanagin, 2016), little is known as to whether
this impact holds regarding populist movements, which
particularly excel in using socialmedia to spread their ide-
ology (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017).
Due to the remarkable ingroup favouritism encouraged
by populism, heuristic cues on the general public per-
ception of populism may be less relevant to commit-
ted populist voters than to populist sympathizers with a
higher need for orientation. For the latter, however, the
informational utility of heuristic social monitoring cues
may either be diminished by the informational utility of
the journalistic content or instead amplified in compari-
son to content-related informational utility due to it re-
quiring less cognitive effort than exposure to counter-
attitudinal contents. Given the overall inconclusive ex-
pectationswith regards to the effects of public sentiment
cues, we examine the following research question:
RQ1: Do public sentiment cues alleviate the attitudi-
nal effects as outlined in H1 and H2?
4. Method
4.1. Overview
To address the hypotheses and research questions, the
present study examined partisan selective exposure to
critical news posts on populism in a 24-hour social media
field experiment during the 2017 federal election cam-
paign in Germany. Participants browsed a mock news-
feed, with eight news posts explicitly including criticism
of the German right-wing populist party AfD. While the
content of the posts was held constant, public sentiment
cues were randomly manipulated within subjects (no
cues vs. ‘likes’ only vs. genuine cues with additional af-
fective user reactions, such as ‘angry’ or ‘love’). The dis-
tinction between ‘likes’ and genuine user reactions was
made to ensure the comparability of findings with previ-
ous studies thatmainly relied on ‘likes’ and for reasons of
ecological validity, as the range of public sentiment cues
on Facebook is constantly expanding.
4.2. Participants
Participants were recruited by an international online
panel company that initially invited a national sample of
2,331 active social media users born in Germany to par-
ticipate in the study in exchange for amonetary incentive.
Of all panel members invited, 358 respondents partici-
pated in the study, corresponding to a response rate of
15.4%. Of those who completed the survey, 77 cases had
to be excluded due to server problems, and a further 33
respondents were excluded on account of having partic-
ipated via smartphone; in both cases, the validity of the
recorded data could not be ensured. Finally, 38 respon-
dents did not comply with the experimental instructions
and were therefore also excluded from the analyses. The
final sample thus consisted of 210 valid cases showing
a satisfactory variation in sociodemographic variables,
and a better representation of national German demo-
graphics than common experimental student samples
(55% male; mean age: M = 35 years, SD = 9; educa-
tion: 52% secondary school, 28% high school, 17% grad-
uate degree).
4.3. Procedure
In an online session of about 20 minutes, respondents
indicated their political attitudes, among other variables,
before they were redirected to the mock newsfeed and
asked to browse its contents and to click on whatever
posts they found interesting. To ensure that the experi-
mental material was considered at least briefly, the time
limit for newsfeed browsing was set to two minutes. The
maximum time limit of ten minutes allowed participants
to scroll through all material at a moderate pace without
having time to read all posts in detail. On average, partic-
ipants spent 4.50 minutes engaging with the newsfeed
(M = 290 sec, SD = 162). Within the scheduled time for
news browsing, participants were able to click on posts
to get to the related full articles or videos and get back
to the newsfeed for continued browsing. After browsing
the news, participants completed a final questionnaire
soliciting psychological and demographic variables.
4.4. Newsfeed and Experimental Material
The exposure task was administered by a software ap-
plication that was specifically developed to simulate a
Facebook-like newsfeed and to unobtrusively track selec-
tive exposure to each post. News posts and linked con-
tents were collected from the 20 Facebook pages with
the widest reach in Germany at that time, including po-
litical news (e.g., Spiegel Online, Bild) and entertainment
news (e.g., Promiflash, sport1). A final sample of 100
posts, whichwere published by these Facebook pages on
the day of the study, were displayed in a randomized or-
der in themock newsfeed to permit the study of partisan
selective exposure under more realistic conditions.
The posts were shown to participants exactly as they
appeared on the original Facebook sites with source,
headline, subheading, picture, and teaser. To test for ef-
fects of public sentiment cues, however, the social en-
dorsements associated with each post were randomly
manipulated within subjects: participants saw the posts
with either (a) no public sentiment cues, (b) ‘likes’ only,
or (c) genuine affective reactions that each post had in-
stigated in the online community (see Figure 1).
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 42–53 45
Figure 1. Example screenshot of an AfD-critical post with
genuine reactions.
Public sentiment cues were randomly assigned to the
100 posts and for each respondent individually based
on nine categories with equal chances to be selected
for display: (1) no public sentiment cues; (2) 1–6 ‘likes’;
(3) 20–48 ‘likes’; (4) 127–406 ‘likes’; (5) 934–3,677 ‘likes’;
(6) 1–6 genuine reactions; (7) 20–48 genuine reactions;
(8) 127–406 genuine reactions; and (9) 934–3,677 gen-
uine reactions (for a similar procedure seeDvir-Gvirsman,
2019; Winter et al., 2016). For reasons of ecological va-
lidity, each post thus had a 1:9 chance of being displayed
without user reactions—on account of the fact thatmost
posts receive at least some user reactions shortly af-
ter being published—and an equal chance of 4:9 of be-
ing displayed with either ‘likes’ or genuine user reac-
tions. For the analyses, the categories were thenmerged
into (a) no public sentiment cues, (b) ‘likes’ only, and
(c) genuine public sentiment cues’. Applying this proce-
dure, each individual AfD-critical post was displayedwith
no cues in 12% of cases, with ‘likes’ in 45% of cases, and
with genuine user reactions in 43% of cases (for further
details, see Table 1).
As the study utilized original, non-manipulated
Facebook posts, two coders content analyzed the posts
post hoc in terms of political relevance, reference to the
AfD party, and mentioned criticism regarding the party.
Among 42 overall political posts in the mock newsfeed
(Krippendorff’s Alpha = .81), nine posts mentioned the
AfD (KAlpha = 1.00), while eight included criticism re-
garding the AfD, mainly expressed through quoted ac-
tors and sources (KAlpha = 1.00). Regarding the pictures
associated with the posts, four posts contained close-
ups of politicians who had made criticism towards the
AfD, two posts used photos of AfD politicians, and two
posts included rather abstract non-personalized pictures.
One post referred to a video (source: Bild) that cov-
ered more than just the AfD, yet with criticism regard-
ing the AfD serving as the lead story. The posts’ sources
reflect a combination of online outlets and subsidiaries
of traditional newspapers (Bild, FAZ.NET), printed news
magazines (Spiegel Online), and TV channels (n-tv), as
well as genuine online sources (Tag24, wize.life, Epoch
Times), with a balanced mix of sources across the politi-




Two selective exposure measures were employed for
each respondent: (a) visibility time of AfD-critical posts in
the newsfeed (in ms), captured by a digital meter point
attached to each post; and (b) number of clicks on AfD-
critical posts to get to the linked contents (0 = no AfD-
critical post was clicked, 8 = all AfD-critical posts were
clicked). For the final analyses, the only posts included
were those which had been visible on the participants’
screens for at least 50ms, representing the approximate
average of an individual’s ability to process the mean-
ing of a picture (Potter, Wyble, Hagmann, & McCourt,
2014). Furthermore, posts were only included if they had
been visible for less than 15 seconds (15,000 ms) in or-
der to avoid drawing inferences on the basis of visibility
times that likely originated from user inactivity. The aver-
age visibility time across all valid posts was 3.62 seconds
(SD = 3.23). The eight AfD-critical posts were visible for
16.08 seconds (SD = 13.99) on participants’ screens. Re-
garding participants’ click behavior, on average, respon-
dents clicked on 4% of the posts they saw (M = .04,
SD = .20). The average number of AfD-critical posts that
participants clicked on was 0.31 (SD = 0.61).
4.5.2. Voting Intention
Tomeasure partisanship in terms of voting intention, par-
ticipantswere asked to indicatewhich of theGerman par-
ties standing for election they were going to vote for. As
populism relies on strong ingroup-outgroup polarization,
participants who indicated voting for the AfD were clas-
sified as the ‘ingroup’ (19%), whereas participants who
did not indicate voting for the AfD were categorized as
the ‘outgroup’ (62%). Respondents who were undecided
were excluded from the analyses (18%), as their support
for the AfD, or its lack thereof, could not be ensured.
4.5.3. Party Affinity
Tomeasure partisanship in terms of party affinity, partici-
pants were asked to indicate howmuch they sympathize
with the AfD on a 5-point scale (1= like not at all; 5= like
very much;M = 2.15, SD = 1.51).
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Table 1. Overview of AfD-critical posts and random assignment of public sentiment cues per post (N = 210).
Source Spiegel Online n-tv Bild FAZ.NET Tag24 wize.life Epoch Times Epoch Times
Headline Justice minister: Maas picks Will AfD e-mail Federal Investigations CSU secretary Maas: AfD Künast fears AfD
(transl.) Maas calls parts AfD affair cost Weidel election: Maas against general Scheuer: program ‘partly in Bundestag: AfD
of AfD program program to her job? +++ calls AfD Gauland after Weidel’s facade unconstitutional’ strives for an
unconstitutional pieces Hurricane Irma: program statement conceals ‘authoritarian democracy’
That’s what unconstitutional against ‘Reichsbürger’ system, not for
Florida looks like. Özuguz ideology”
Original Public
Sentiment Cues
No Public 13% 10% 10% 14% 12% 9% 11% 15%Sentiment Cues
‘Likes’ Only 42% 47% 43% 47% 51% 43% 42% 47%
Genuine Public 45% 43% 47% 39% 37% 48% 47% 39%Sentiment Cues
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4.5.4. Control Variables
Additional measures were included to control for con-
founding influences of two basic individual predisposi-
tions known to affect selective exposure, political inter-
est and dogmatism. Regarding political interest, respon-
dents were asked to indicate their general interest in
politics (1 = not interested at all; 10 = very interested;
M = 7.35, SD = 2.34). Dogmatism was measured by
eleven items adopted from Shearman and Levine (2006),
measured on 5-point scales (1 = do not agree at all;
5 = fully agree). The items were averaged to form an in-
dex of dogmatism (M = 2.40, SD = 0.54, Cronbach’s al-
pha = .755).
5. Results
To test the effects of voting intention and party affin-
ity on selective exposure to AfD-critical news posts with
distinct public sentiment cues, a series of OLS regres-
sions was conducted, one for each public sentiment cue
type (no vs. ‘likes’ only vs. genuine). Based on two indi-
cators of selective news exposure (visibility time, num-
ber of clicks), each model included voting intention and
party affinity as predictors, while additionally controlling
for age, gender, education, political interest, and dogma-
tism. Results are shown in Table 2.
Regarding news posts without public sentiment cues,
the analyses revealed a confirmation bias for those who
had already made up their minds about whom to cast
their vote for in the upcoming election. In line with H1,
prospective AfD voters were less likely to spend time on
AfD-critical posts in their newsfeed (𝛽 = −.30, p = .054)
and less likely to click on AfD-critical posts in order to en-
gage with the linked contents (𝛽 = −.38, p = .012). In to-
tal, prospective AfD voters spent 2966 ms less time on
AfD-critical posts and clicked on 0.25 fewer AfD-critical
posts than prospective voters of other parties.
Regarding party affinity, the analyses yielded reverse
effects on selective exposure for those who tentatively
identified with the party. In line with H2, higher affinity
for the AfD led to longer visibility times of AfD-critical
posts on the participants’ screens (𝛽 = .37, p = .02)
and increased number of clicks on such posts (𝛽 = .29,
p = .069). In total, visibility time of and number of clicks
on AfD-critical posts increased by 952ms and 0.05 clicks,
respectively, with each scale point on the incremental
AfD-affinity scale.1
When public sentiment cues were present, how-
ever, these attitudinal patterns disappeared, regardless
of whether news posts were accompanied by ‘likes’ or
additional affective user reactions (RQ1). Visibility time
and number of clicks were no longer influenced by vot-
ing intention or party affinity (ps > .10), implying a con-
ditional effect of partisanship on selective exposure to
AfD-critical news posts contingent upon the presence of
other users’ reactions.
6. Conclusions
In recent years, whether or not citizens are aware of
the challenges populism poses for liberal democracy has
become a crucial question for communication scholars.
This question primarily implies an openness for counter-
attitudinal information among supporters of populist
parties. While cross-cutting exposure is generally con-
ceived of as a decisive “criterion of citizen performance
in democracy” (Chaffee, Saphir, Graf, Sandvig, & Hahn,
2010, p. 247), its practical implementation is a matter
of constant debate. The present study aimed to further
our understanding of the circumstances affecting recep-
tiveness to attitude-challenging information by examin-
ing selective exposure to critical-analytical news posts on
the German right-wing populist party AfD as a function
of partisan commitment and social monitoring in a pre-
election context.
Our findings imply two distinct patterns of exposure
to AfD-critical news posts, depending on participants’
attitudinal commitment to the party. In line with H1,
participants who have already decided to vote for the
Table 2. Impact of voting intention and political affinity on selective exposure to AfD-critical news posts by public sentiment
cue type, beta weights (p-values in parentheses).
No Public Sentiment Cues ‘Likes’ Only Genuine Public Sentiment Cues
Visibility Number of Visibility Number of Visibility Number of
Time Clicks Time Clicks Time Clicks
AfD Voting Intention –.30 (.054) –.38 (.012) .13 (.301) .04 (.731) .01 (.916) –.03 (.839)
AfD Party Affinity .37 (.02) .29 (.069) –.12 (.400) –.14 (.288) –.14 (.297) –.08 (.578)
R2 .12 .14 .04 .04 .09 .08
N 103 103 155 155 155 155
Notes: All analyses controlled for age, gender, education, political interest, and dogmatism, and showed acceptable variance inflation
values of VIFs < 3.
1 Since two AfD-critical posts in the mock newsfeed were published by ‘Epoch Times’, which is known to be AfD-friendly, the analyses were re-run
without these two posts in order to ensure the robustness of the findings. Results lean in the same direction, albeit with less power due to the reduced
sample size.
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AfD were less likely to approach critical news about the
party than the ‘outgroup’ of non-AfD voters, both in
terms of how long they attended to posts in the ex-
perimental newsfeed and regarding their willingness to
engage with linked contents. However, the effect was
more pronounced regarding click decisions than atten-
tion allocation during browsing, indicating that commit-
ted partisans were more likely to incidentally encounter
attitude-challenging information in social media envi-
ronments without necessarily dealing with the informa-
tion in more detail. This finding may help reconcile con-
flicting evidence on the persistence of confirmation bi-
ases in digital media environments by lending support
for both the notion of incidental exposure (e.g., Nelson
& Webster, 2017) and partisan selective exposure (e.g.,
Bakshy et al., 2015). Both exposure patterns appear to
refer to different levels of news engagement, with ex-
posure to counter-attitudinal contents being more pro-
nounced on the level of peripheral elaboration in the
course of newsfeed browsing. These results carry some-
what discouraging implications for citizens’ awareness of
populist threats, as confirmation biases appear to prolif-
erate under circumstances of increased incidental expo-
sure to attitude-challenging information. Incidental ex-
posuremay even have reinforced the active avoidance of
contents linked to the posts, thereby potentially exacer-
bating political polarization (see also Weeks et al., 2017).
However, this notion only applies to committed vot-
ers and thus only to a fraction of awider range of populist
supporters. For the larger share of populist sympathizers,
the analyses yielded opposite effects, in line with H2, by
showing that participants with a higher affinity for the
AfDweremore likely to attend to and click on AfD-critical
news posts. This finding supports the notion of a greater
need for orientation among populist sympathizers, who
were—following informational utility frameworks (e.g.,
Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012)—expected to
approach populism-critical news in order to reduce un-
certainty regarding their political preferences. This no-
tion is further supported by the finding that the effects
of party affinity especially occurred during news brows-
ing. Hence, the informational needs of populist sympa-
thizers to learn about the democratic challenges posed
by populism clearly dominate news exposure in the face
of a multitude of alternative user options in high-choice
media environments.
These findings extend previous research on estab-
lished democratic parties by showing that new political
movements are likely related to two distinct types of
supporter which do not necessarily overlap: supporters
with a high commitment to a populist party and sup-
porters with a high affinity for a populist party’s agenda.
While prospective voters (high commitment) were more
likely to avoid uncongenial information as commonly ex-
pected and found in extant research, party sympathizers
(high affinity) were primarily interested in information
that challenged their political preferences.While the first
group may thus not be reached by critical news on pop-
ulist threats to democracy and, hence, not be amenable
to counterarguments, the latter and larger group of pop-
ulist sympathizers appears significantly more open to de-
liberate discussions on populism. Given the shift to the
right in many western democracies and an increasing
polarization of the electorate along populist demarca-
tion lines, our findings hence encourage a closer look
at who we are talking about when speaking of pop-
ulists and their potential resilience to the values of lib-
eral democracy.
Our study additionally suggests that even confirma-
tion biases shown by highly committed populist vot-
ers may be attenuated in social media environments.
When populism-critical news posts were accompanied
by public sentiment cues (RQ1), attitudinal impacts dis-
appeared. In line with earlier research on the moderat-
ing role of social endorsements in partisan selective ex-
posure (e.g., Winter et al., 2016), committed AfD vot-
ers did not differ significantly from non-AfD voters if so-
cial monitoring cues were present, suggesting that users
tend to adapt to the social news environment instead of
solely relying on individual predispositions (Porten-Cheé
& Eilders, 2019). Similar effects occurred with regards to
populist sympathizers: exposure to AfD-critical posts was
no longer decided upon AfD affinity under the presence
of social monitoring cues, indicating that the informa-
tional utility of public sentiment cues exceeds message-
related informational utility to a certain degree. Hence,
heuristic cues appear to become increasingly decisive
in what messages users engage with in social news en-
vironments. Even in case of high political commitment,
such cues may provide important guidance for media
users by satisfying an increasing need for ‘analytic labour’
(Karakayali & Kilic, 2013), while simultaneously demand-
ing little cognitive effort. This appears to apply both
to classic ‘likes’ as aggregate forms of public approval
(Winter et al., 2016) and to emoticonswith a greater vari-
ety of expressed emotions. Although this study—due to
its relatively small sample size—did not allow for a more
detailed analysis of the specific number of public senti-
ment cues and its effects on selective exposure, these
findings indicate that the mere presence of social cues
may limit problematic selection biases and provide fer-
tile ground for citizens—independent of their political
background—to (re-)connect with political outgroups. In
light of the increased need for social orientation in digital
environments, future research should delve deeper into
the question of exactly when and how this promising im-
pact of social monitoring cues comes into play.
The findings of the present study need to be seen in
light of several limitations. First, criticism regarding the
AfD is likely related to a generally higher news value of
negative information. Negativity bias could thus be a po-
tential confound in our analyses of selective exposure
(Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006) that could
not be accounted for in the present study due to the high
ecological validity of the design, using non-manipulated
content actually published by main news sites. Hence,
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 42–53 49
negativity bias should be considered in future research
on populism by examining valence (negative, positive)
and attitude-(in)consistency independently. The same
limitation applies to the valence of public sentiment cues,
as our field study did not to allow for systematic varia-
tion of genuine user reactions. As Table 1 showed, most
of the original user reactions that were prompted by
the eight AfD-critical posts contained a similar combina-
tion of emoticons (mostly ‘angry’ and ‘amused’), along
with ‘likes’. This naturally existing user-generated mate-
rial reflects not only a limited possibility for researchers
to achieve satisfactory variation in social cues when re-
lying on non-manipulated content, thereby complicat-
ing systematic comparisons; it also points to the diffi-
culty of interpreting the messages that such combina-
tions potentially send to the readers. In case of the com-
bination of ‘angry’ and ‘amused’ cues, for instance, it
remains unclear whether users thereby primarily per-
ceive support or critique by other users with regards
to what is mentioned in the post. Future research is
needed to look deeper into the semantic meaning of
combined affective user reactions in order to allow for
a meaningful, systematic variation of public sentiment
cues. On a related note, the present study examined at-
tention to public sentiment cues only indirectly by infer-
ring participants’ awareness of such cues from observed
user behaviours, following extant research in this area
(Messing & Westwood, 2014; Winter et al., 2016). Al-
though this implies a certain risk of drawing false infer-
ences if participants do not actually pay attention to such
cues, studies utilizing eye-tracking during news browsing
demonstrated that users do indeed take such cues into
account when browsing and selecting information on-
line (e.g., Dvir-Gvirsman, 2019). Future research should
build on these findings to develop a valid and easy to
implement measure of attention allocation towards so-
cial cues in order to allow for more rigorous manipula-
tion checks and to thereby overcome the need for more
complex field experiments to rely on indirect inferences
when studying the effects of social cues. A related lim-
itation of the study pertains to the indirect test of the
effects of informational utility on selective exposure. Fol-
lowing approaches suggested by Knobloch-Westerwick
and colleagues (Knobloch-Westerwick& Kleinman, 2012;
Pearson & Knobloch-Westerwick, 2019), the present
study implied greater utility of attitude-inconsistent
posts among voters with a higher need for orienta-
tion, in this case, populist sympathizers. Future studies
should take this approach further by directly measuring
the perceived utility of attitude-consistent and counter-
attitudinal information as a function of political predispo-
sition. Moreover, future research is needed to examine
the specific motivational drivers of counter-attitudinal
exposure exhibited by populist sympathizers, as they
may influence information processing differently. On the
one hand, the higher need for orientation among pop-
ulist sympathizers may be related to accuracy motiva-
tions (Hart et al., 2009) to achieve an adequate under-
standing of populism and could thereby promote politi-
cal depolarization. This notion would be in line with find-
ings by Beam et al. (2018) on the depolarizing effects of
counter-attitudinal exposure on Facebook. On the other
hand, the informational needs of populist sympathizers
could also rely on defense motivations (Hart et al., 2009)
to reinforce tentative attitudes by engaging in disconfir-
mation biases (Taber & Lodge, 2006), which may even-
tually increase political polarization, as suggested by the
findings of Weeks et al. (2017).
Besides these open questions—mostly originating
from the study’s aim to achieve high ecological validity,
resulting in a more complex design compared to more
traditional experimental studies—the ecological validity
of this study has its limits, too. Specifically, exposure pat-
terns of populist voters and sympathizers may be dif-
ferent if examined in even more natural exposure situa-
tions, because populists are commonly known to distrust
mainstream media, as primarily—although not solely—
examined in the present study, to a special degree and
to more strongly rely on alternative media (Haller &
Holt, 2018).
Despite these caveats, our study provides important
insights on exposure to counter-attitudinal information
in times of political and technological upheaval. By mea-
suring partisanship in a more nuanced way and by study-
ing exposure in realistic high-choice, social user settings,
our findings suggest two main implications: first, that
affinity to populism alone does not necessarily equate
with intolerance towards populism-critical information,
and second, that social cues provided by today’s news
environments may serve as decisive elements to contain
selection biases to the benefit of a deliberate public dis-
course in turbulent political times.
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